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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NET-METERING AGREEMENTS: SEEKING 
TO AVOID CAPTURE IN THE WESTERN DISTRICT 
 
Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Solar energy is the most abundant energy resource available on 
earth, and the demand for it is at an all-time high in the United States.2 
However, the cost of producing solar electricity is relatively high 
compared to the costs of producing electricity by burning coal or nuclear 
fission.3 To respond to the increased demand, federal and state 
governments have adopted programs to offset the higher costs of solar 
production.4 Net-metering agreements between utility companies and 
residents with solar panels allow those residents to receive credit on their 
utility bills for energy pushed back into the utility company’s grid. Net-
metering agreements are one way to keep costs down because residential 
                                                 
1 Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823 (2015). 
2 Erin R. Pierce, Top 6 Things You Didn’t Know About Solar Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY (June 22, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/top-6-things-you-didnt-know-about-
solar-energy.  
3 E.g., Kevin Karges, Note, Net Metering: Do Non-Solar Homeowners and Utility 
Companies Have a Legitimate Gripe?, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1017 (2014). 
4 Id. 
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solar energy requires minimal government oversight and public 
investment.5  
However, said government oversight may cause problems because 
the government and its agencies should be acting impartially when 
regulating the utility industry and net-metering agreements. So, when 
disputes arise in courts, judges will closely examine each party’s 
relationship with the agency and will want to avoid ruling favorably for a 
party which already has a close relationship with an agency. Sometimes 
government agencies develop too close of a relationship with an industry, 
causing the government agency to no longer work for public interest.6 
Agency “capture” occurs when an agency prioritizes its regulated 
industry’s interests over public interest. 
As net metering is a relatively new practice, there is little case law 
on point to guide counsel and judges when disputes arise between 
consumers and a utility company. These types of net-metering disputes 
could potentially affect all utility consumers because higher costs for the 
utility companies will be passed on to its consumers. Therefore, when an 
                                                 
5 Id. at 1019. 
6 See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 31 (2013). 
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agency has the power to make a unilateral decision which would favor one 
party, the decision could problematically lead to agency capture and 
overreach unless proper safeguards like judicial review are implemented. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2008, the Missouri legislature passed the Renewable Energy 
Standard,7 a statutory scheme designed to promote renewable energy 
sources among consumers and producers.8 Section 393.1030.3, as part of 
the Solar Energy Rebate Program (“Rebate Program”), requires all electric 
utilities to “make available to its retail customers a solar rebate for new or 
expanded solar electric systems sited on customers’ premises.”9 The 
Renewable Energy Standard gives the Missouri Public Service 
Commission (“the Commission”) the authority to make any rules 
necessary to enforce the Renewable Energy Standard.10  
Accordingly, the Commission enacted a regulation which requires 
electric utility companies to make a rebate available for consumers who 
own or lease solar-generated power equipment interconnected with the 
                                                 
7 MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1020 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
8 Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 824. 
9 MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1030.3 (Cum. Supp. 2013).  Some electric utilities are exempt 
from this provision.  Those exemptions are contained in § 393.1050. 
10 § 393.1030.2. 
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utility’s system.11 As part of the interconnection Rebate Program, the 
Commission also requires consumers and utilities to enter into an 
Interconnection Agreement and lay out the terms of the Agreement in a 
form.12 The Commission’s Agreement form contains a dispute resolution 
provision.13  
Pursuant to the Renewable Energy Standard and the Rebate 
Program, Kansas City Power & Light (“Utility Company”) advertised 
solar rebates on its website, soliciting its customers to participate.14 On its 
website, the Utility Company also listed approved installers of the solar-
power systems, one of which was United States Solar.15 The Utility 
Company’s forms contained a Net-Metering Agreement, which mirrored 
                                                 
11 MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240-20.100(4) (2016). 
12 Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 825. “If the electric utility so chooses, it may allow customers to 
apply electronically through the electric utility’s website.  The interconnection agreement 
on the electric utility’s website shall substantially be the same as the interconnection 
agreement included herein.” Id. at 825 (citing MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–
20.065(9) (2016)). 
13 Id. The language of the provision provides: “If any disagreements between the 
Customer . . . and [Utility] arise that cannot be resolved through normal negotiations 
between them, the disagreements may be brought to the [Commission] by either party, 
through an informal or formal complaint.” MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240-20.065 
(D)(8) (2016). 
14 Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 825. 
15 Id. 
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the language of Commission’s Agreement form, including a dispute 
resolution provision.16  
Richard Sharp and five other consumers were participants in the 
rebate program, and all were so dissatisfied with the solar-power systems’ 
quality and performance that they brought a class action against the utility 
company, the installer, and two individual company owners.17 The 
Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violation of 
the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.18 The Utility Company filed a 
Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay Proceedings and Compel 
Arbitration because the Agreement containing the dispute resolution 
provision was a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.19 Plaintiffs 
filed a Supplemental Brief in Opposition alleging the installer had 
fraudulently induced the Plaintiffs into signing a blank iPad screen, and 
the signatures were later “copied and/or forged” onto the Net-Metering 
Agreement.20 Plaintiffs claimed they never received any written 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Appellants’ Brief at 1, Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823 (2015) 
(No. 13BU-CV03671), 2014 WL 4659592 at *1. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
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documents21 and “never . . . could have seen any agreement that 
Defendants now allege serve as the basis of Defendants’ present 
motions.”22 The trial court allowed the Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended 
Petition for Damages, but acknowledged that Missouri Courts tend to 
favor arbitration.23 
The trial court, the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, was 
ultimately not persuaded that the Plaintiffs agreed to the Net-Metering 
Agreement, including the dispute resolution provision, because “a person 
who claims never to have seen nor signed a contract [should not] be bound 
by the terms therein.”24 The trial court thereby found that the consumers 
had not signed the contracts containing the dispute resolution provision.25 
Utility Company appealed the trial court’s decision, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Western District of Missouri held the dispute resolution 
                                                 
21 Brief for the Respondents at 4, Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823 
(2015) (No. 13BU-CV03671), 2014 WL 5286452, at *4. 
22 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 17, at 4. 
23 Sharp v. KCE&L, LLC, No. 13BU-VC03671, 2014 WL 5502554, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 
Mar. 27, 2014). 
24 Id. at *2. 
25 Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
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provision was not an arbitration agreement, affirming the trial court’s 
decision.26  
The appellate court held de novo that the trial court had properly 
denied Utility Company’s motion to stay proceedings and compel 
arbitration.27 In making this decision, the appellate court looked to three 
factors: (1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; (2) whether the 
dispute falls within the scope of the agreement; and (3) whether applicable 
contract principles subject the agreement to revocation.28 When a dispute 
resolution provision is not specific as to the type of dispute resolution, 
then the fact finder may not necessarily hold the provision is an agreement 
to arbitrate. Although, the provision need not use the express term 
“arbitration”29 for the fact finder to determine an arbitration agreement 
exists between the parties. However, without an agreement to arbitrate, a 
party cannot compel arbitration.30 
 
 
                                                 
26 Id. at 824, 828. 
27 Id. at 826. 
28 Id. (citing Baier v. Darden Rests., 420 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)). 
29 Id. at 827.  
30 Id. at 829-30. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Commission’s limited jurisdiction and the general 
preference for arbitration where parties have agreed to it 
 
This case is important because it falls within a relatively 
undeveloped area of Missouri law, specifically what role the Commission 
has in disputes arising from net-metering agreements between a utility 
company and a consumer. Net-metering agreements have been used 
increasingly between utility companies and consumers for renewable 
energy, and the Commission, not the Utility Company, drafted the terms 
for the Agreement between the parties.31  
Disputes between consumers and utility companies are not new, 
but only courts can construe and enforce contracts. In 1957, the Kansas 
City Court of Appeals reiterated the Commission’s limited jurisdiction in 
Katz v. Kan. City Power & Light.32 There, a consumer sued the Utility 
Company to recover a refund allegedly due under the terms of the contract 
between the two parties,33 but the Utility Company wanted the issue 
                                                 
31 Id. at 825. 
32 Katz v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 303 S.W.2d 672, 679 (1957) (citing State ex rel, 
Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. Buzard, 168 S.W.2d 1044, 1046 (Mo. 1943)). 
33 Id. at 680. 
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before the Commission, not the court.34 The Commission only has powers 
statutes confer upon it35 and cannot construe or enforce contracts.36 
Therefore, the circuit court properly had jurisdiction over the issues in the 
dispute, not the Commission.37  
In Sharp, the Utility Company cites to AMF38 as persuasive 
authority for courts’ strong preference for arbitration. In AMF, competitor 
manufacturers agreed to bring their disputes in the form of nonbinding 
arbitration.39 A dispute arose, and the court found the dispute subject to 
the agreement for nonbinding arbitration and compelled arbitration.40 In 
the case at bar, Utility Company lifts a sentence out of the AMF opinion in 
its reply brief: “If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute for a decision 
by a third party, they have agreed to arbitration.”41 However, in context of 
                                                 
34 Id. at 678. 
35 Id. at 679 (citing State ex rel. Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. Buzard, 168 S.W.2d 
1044, 1046 (Mo. 1943)). 
36 Id. (citing State ex rel. Washington Univ. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 272 S.W. 971, 972 
(Mo. 1925)). 
37 Id. at 680. 
38 See generally AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
39 Id. at 458. The agreement provides: “Both parties agree to submit any controversy 
which they may have . . . to such advisory third party for the rendition of an advisory 
opinion.  Such opinion shall not be binding upon the parties . . . The parties agree that the 
National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business is agreeable to each as 
the advisory third party.” Id. at 459. 
40 Id. at 463. 
41 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 15, Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823 
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the AMF opinion, this sentence is part of dicta discussing arbitration in 
general, not the manufacturers’ dispute.42 
Further, Wolsey provides relevant background on the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).43 The parties’ contract contained a dispute 
resolution provision,44 and the district court assumed the parties’ dispute 
resolution provision referred to arbitration.45 The Ninth Circuit found “no 
magic words such as ‘arbitrate’ or ‘binding arbitration’ or ‘final dispute 
resolution’ are needed to arbitrate.”46 “The FAA was designed to overrule 
the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate,” 
and “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.”47 The court decided to compel 
arbitration.48 
                                                                                                                         
(Mo. Ct. App.  2015) (WD 77444), 2014 WL 5911478, at *15 (citing AMF Inc., 621 F. 
Supp. at 460). 
42 AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. at 460. 
43 Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998). 
44 Id. at 1209. The agreement language says that “all controversies, disputes or claims . . . 
shall be submitted for non-binding arbitration to . . . the American Arbitration 
Association on demand of either party.” Id. 
45 Id. at 1213 n.3. 
46 Id. at 1208. 
47 Id. at 1209 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) 
and Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)). 
48 Wolsey Ltd., 144 F.3d at 1213. 
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More recently, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled on compelling 
arbitration in Triarch Industries, Inc. v. Crabtree.49 The policy favoring 
arbitration regards the parties’ intent as evidenced by their agreement.50 
The ordinary meaning of the contract’s terms expresses the parties’ 
intent,51 and where the contract is not ambiguous, the court will determine 
the parties’ intent from the four corners of the contract.52 So, “while courts 
look favorably upon clauses entitling a party to arbitration, this does not 
mean that a court will . . . read a right to arbitrate into a contract where the 
contract does not provide such a right.”53 Therefore, a party cannot be 
compelled to arbitrate unless that party has agreed to it in the contract.54 
B. The Renewable Energy Standard 
 
In November 2008, Missouri voters approved the Renewable 
Energy Standard, a statutory scheme designed to encourage the use of 
                                                 
49 See generally Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772 (Mo. 2005). 
50 Id. at 776 (quoting Keymer v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc. 169 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 
1999)). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 777 n.7 (citing Eisenberg v. Redd, 38 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 2001)). 
53 Id. at 777 (citing AJM Packaging Corp. v. Crossland Const. Co., Inc., 962 S.W.2d 906, 
911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)). 
54 E.g., Kan. City Urology v. United Healthcare Serv., 261 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2008). 
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renewable energy sources.55 The scheme requires investor-owned utilities 
to offer rebates to encourage the use of renewable energy by meeting 
fifteen percent of the company’s annual retail sales by 2021.56 In June 
2014, the rebates would decrease annually until they cease on June 30, 
2020.57 The rebate decrease incentivizes consumers to implement 
renewable energy technology sooner rather than later.58 The statute gives 
the Commission authority to enforce the statutes,59 and the Commission 
drafted the interconnection net-metering Agreement at issue in Sharp.60 
Utility companies must use interconnection agreements “substantially the 
same” as the interconnection agreement the Commission drafted.61 
Net-metering agreements, like the Agreement between the Utility 
Company and the consumers, are used widely as part of renewable energy 
efforts.62 Net-metering agreements encourage solar installations because 
                                                 
55 Renewable Energy Standard, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY STANDARD (last 




59 MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1020 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
60 Sharp v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 457 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
61 MO. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 240-20.065(9)(A) (2015). 
62 Specifically, forty-three states use net-metering agreements for solar energy 
transactions between consumers and utility companies. E.g. Kayci G. Hines, Solar Shift: 
An Analysis of the Federal Income Tax Issues Associated with the Residential Value of 
Solar Tariff, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 388, 390 (2015). 
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households with solar panels can spin their electric meters backwards if 
they generate enough energy to push power back into the utility 
company’s energy grid.63 If the home produces enough energy to send 
power to the grid, the utility company purchases the electricity for a credit 
on the consumer’s monthly bill,64 banking credit for the consumers.65 
Despite these benefits, solar panel systems are expensive, and their 
continued viability may depend on government-mandated incentives and 
rebates.66  
C. Contractual disputes before the Commission and in 
Missouri, generally 
 
Later, the Commission itself determined it could not interpret a 
contractual dispute between a utility company and a consumer in Shawnee 
Bend Dev. Co. v. Lake Region Water & Sewer Co.67 The parties’ contract 
contained a conditional provision for arbitration, but the Commission 
                                                 
63 Kevin Karges, Net Metering: Do Non-Solar Homeowners and Utility Companies Have 
a Legitimate Gripe?, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1017, 1018 (2014). 
64 Id. 
65 Alexander D. White, Compromise in Colorado: Solar Net Metering and the Case for 
“Renewable Avoided Cost”, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2015). 
66 Id. at 1098-99. 
67 Shawnee Bend Dev. Co. v. Lake Region Water & Sewer Co., No. 2009 WL 762536, at 
*1-2 (Mo. P.S.C. 2009).  
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could not determine whether that condition had been met.68 The 
Commission cannot interpret contracts, including whether the contractual 
condition had been met.69 The Commission only has authority to arbitrate 
when both parties have agreed in writing to submit the particular dispute 
to arbitration before it.70 
In Sharp, the Utility Company cites to MFA, Inc. v. HLW Builders, 
Inc.,71 which discusses mandatory arbitration and permissive arbitration.72 
However, the MFA opinion relies on a case which states deliberately using 
the word “may” instead of “shall” shows “the parties’ intent to make 
arbitration permissive” and discretionary.73 The MFA opinion relies on 
Maloney-Rafaie,74 even though the language of the MFA agreement is 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at *2. 
70 Id. at *1. 
71 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 17, at 9, 26; see also MFA, Inc. v. HLW Builders, Inc., 
303 S.W.3d 620, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).  
72 MFA, Inc., 303 S.W.3d at 623-24. 
73 DiCesare-Bentley v. City of New London, 1990 WL 283866, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 3, 1990). 
74 Maloney-Refaie v. Bridge at Sch., Inc., 958 A.2d 871, 884 (Del. Ch. 2008). In 
Maloney-Rafaie, an arbitration clause in an employment agreement contained the 
language: “Any controversy, claim or dispute arising from or relating to this Agreement . 
. . upon mutual agreement of the parties, shall be resolved in accordance with the 
National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes of the American Arbitration 
Association . . .” Id. at 883 (emphasis added).  
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“may” and the language of the Maloney agreement is “shall.”75 In Sharp, 
the Utility Company argued that the word “may” in the contract “grants 
one side a right to pursue arbitration if it wished[,] and mandatory 
arbitration is required when one side so requests.”76 Essentially, the Utility 
Company argued that the optional remedy turns into a compulsory 
procedure once one party decides to ask for the remedy of arbitration.77 
However, it is incorrect and illogical to require a party who agreed to a 
provision containing the words “may be brought” to mandatory arbitration 
because the provision could have said “shall be brought” and does not.78  
Further, arbitration contracts must be proven.79 The party asserting 
the existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration contract bears the 
burden of proving that proposition.80 Elements of a valid contract are 
offer, acceptance, and bargained for consideration. All three elements 
                                                 
75 Wes Dagestad, Student Contribution: Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Sharp – iPad 
Signatures Leave Courts Reconstructing the Mona Lisa on an “Etch-A-Sketch”, PROF. 
ROYCE DE ROHAN BARONDES: CASUAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS & 
BUSINESS ENTITIES, (Mar. 4, 2015) http://missouri-k.com/?page_id=818.  
76 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 17, at *26 (citing Maloney-Refaie, 958 A.2d at 884). 
77 Id. 
78 Dagestad, supra note 75. 
79 Baier v. Darden Rest., 420 S.W.3d 733, 737-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Collins v. 
Swope, 605 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo. Ct. App.  1980)).  
80 Id. at 737. 
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must be proven to establish an arbitration contract.81 Additionally, mutual 
assent must occur at the time of the contract, not later.82 In Baier, the 
Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri found a former 
employee was not bound to arbitrate her dispute with her former 
employer.83 Without the employer’s signature on certain portions of the 
contract, the defendants failed to establish a valid arbitration contract.84 
Without a signature, the party claiming a contract was formed must 
present other evidence to establish assent to abide by the agreement’s 
terms.85 
Lastly, the circuit court used the reasoning in Baier to solidify that 
offer and acceptance require a meeting of the minds and assenting to the 
                                                 
81 Id. at 737-38 (citing Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. 
banc 1988)). 
82 Id. at 738 (citing Kunzie v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc., 330 S.W.3d 476, 483 (Mo. Ct. App.  
2010)). 
83 Id. at 733. 
84 Id. at 741. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District affirmed the trial 
court’s finding that the employer and employee did not mutually assent to the terms of 
the dispute resolution agreement, therefore the employer failed to establish the existence 
of a valid arbitration agreement. Id. at 738. There were two signature lines on the form—
one for the employer and one for the employee. Id. at 735. Since the employer drafted the 
contract, the trial court determined that the employer intended both the employee and 
employer’s management to sign or initial each line. Id. at 739. The employer’s signature 
line was actually left blank. Id. at 735. An absence of an offeror’s signature presents a 
fact question requiring the trial court to determine the offeror’s intent. Id. at 739. Thus, 
the employer could not compel arbitration. Id.  
85 Id. at 739. 
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same thing in the same sense at the same time.86 The case was tried 
without a jury, and Judge Judah was unpersuaded by the argument that a 
person who claims never to have seen nor signed a contract is required to 
be bound by its terms.87 The consumers could not have agreed to arbitrate 
disputes with Utility Company if they had not seen the contract’s terms 
when they signed the iPad.88 Utility Company argued on appeal the 
preference for arbitration and applicable contract principles require the 
consumers be compelled to arbitration.89 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
After the trial court denied the Utility Company’s motion to 
compel arbitration, the Utility Company argued on appeal the trial “court 
erred because the consumers’ complaints were within the scope of the . . . 
valid and enforceable dispute resolution provision,” and the provision 
embodied an agreement to arbitrate before the Commission.90 The court 
held the trial court properly denied the Utility Company’s motion because 
                                                 
86 Sharp v. KCE&L, LLC, 2014 WL 5502554, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2014). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 825-26. 
90 Id. at 826. 
 234 
the dispute resolution provision was not an agreement to arbitrate 
disputes.91 
Three factors should be considered when determining whether to 
grant a motion to compel arbitration: “(1) whether a valid arbitration 
agreement exists; (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the 
agreement; and (3) whether applicable contract principles subject the 
agreement to revocation.”92 Although the trial court never resolved the 
first factor, whether the dispute resolution provision constituted an 
arbitration agreement, appellate courts do not need to agree with the trial 
court’s reasoning in order to affirm.93  
Even though courts look favorably upon enforcing agreements to 
arbitrate disputes, the instant court held courts do not have to find and 
enforce an arbitration agreement if the parties have not agreed to it in their 
contract.94 Therefore, the Utility Company bore the burden of proving a 
valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate disputes existed.95 The Utility 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 827 n.5. Appellate “courts are ‘concerned primarily with reaching a correct 
result, and thus . . . do not need to agree with the reasoning of the trial court in order to 
affirm.’” Id. (quoting McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996)).  
94 Id. at 827-28. 
95 Id. 
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Company argued arbitration agreements do not specifically need to use the 
word “arbitrate” to come within the FAA’s coverage.96 The instant court 
agreed with the Utility Company but narrowed the Utility Company’s 
argument, holding not every dispute resolution provision constitutes an 
agreement to arbitrate.97 In other words, only some dispute resolution 
provisions are arbitration agreements. Furthermore, the court declined to 
accept the Utility Company’s argument that all dispute resolution 
provisions constitute arbitration agreements.98 The dispute resolution 
provision in Sharp is an example of a dispute resolution provision that is 
not an arbitration agreement.99 Nevertheless, the court agreed all 
arbitration agreements constitute dispute resolution provisions.100  
Dispute resolution includes negotiation, mediation, litigation, and 
arbitration.101 The parties’ dispute resolution provision “provides for 
‘dispute resolution’ in the form of either ‘an informal or formal 
complaint’” to be brought to the Commission.102 The provision identifies 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 827-28. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 827. 
101 Id. at 828. 
102 Id. 
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the regulation103 governing the complaint filing procedure.104 The court 
declined to accept the Utility Company’s argument that the reference to 
the regulation was a procedural mechanism for the parties to commence 
arbitration.105 The formal and informal complaint process did not 
constitute arbitration.106 Even if the court accepted the Utility Company’s 
argument, the Utility Company still did not demonstrate the necessary 
prerequisites to invoke the Commission’s authority under the dispute 
resolution provision because the Utility Company failed to file a formal or 
informal complaint.107  
Of course, the court notes the consumers would have been the ones 
filing a complaint in front of the Commission, not the Utility Company.108 
This reasoning solidifies the court’s determination that the dispute 
resolution provision was never intended to be an arbitration agreement.109 
If the Commission had intended the dispute resolution provision to be an 
                                                 
103 MO. CODE REGS. ANN., tit. 4 § 240-2.070(1) (2016) (providing “any person or public 
utility who feels aggrieved by an alleged violation of any tariff, statute, rule, order, or 
decision within the commission’s jurisdiction may file a complaint”).   




108 Id. at 830 n.6. 
109 Id. 
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arbitration agreement, the Utility Company would not need to file a 
complaint in front of the Commission and move to compel arbitration 
because usually a party will do one or the other but not both.110  
Additionally, the Commission drafted the dispute resolution 
provision, and “the provision contains no reference whatsoever to . . . the 
sole authority”111 allowing the Commission to act as arbitrators.112 The 
court’s finding suggests the Commission did not intend the dispute 
resolution provision to include arbitration for controversies arising out of 
net-metering agreements.113 Further, the court cannot see how a non-party 
to a contract could “ever bind parties to mandatory arbitration.”114 
In addition, statutory prerequisites must be fulfilled before the 
Commission can exercise its limited jurisdiction.115 The Commission’s 
authority to act as arbitrators is limited to controversies between public 
utilities or between public utilities and persons, only where “all the parties 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 386.230 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (providing “Whenever any public 
utility has a controversy with another public utility or person and all the parties . . . agree 
in writing to submit such controversy to the [C]ommission as arbitrators, the 
[C]ommission shall act as . . . arbitrators . . . and . . . hear such controversy, and their 
award shall be final”). 
112 Sharp, 457 S.W.3d at 828. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 830 n.8. 
115 Id. at 828-29. 
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. . . agree in writing to submit such controversy to the [C]ommission as 
arbitrators.”116 Here, the statutory prerequisites for the Commission to act 
as arbitrators were not met.117 The consumers did not agree in writing to 
submit the controversy to the Commission, and the consumers were very 
opposed to arbitration before the Commission.118 Further, the statutory 
language “in writing” has been interpreted to mean a post-dispute 
agreement in writing.119 
Because the consumers strongly opposed arbitration and the trial 
court found the consumers did not sign the contracts containing the 
dispute resolution provision, the Utility Company failed to show the 
parties agreed in writing to submit the controversy to the Commission as 
arbitrators.120 Therefore, the Utility Company failed to invoke the 
Commission’s arbitration authority under § 386.230.121 Thus, the Utility 
Company failed to demonstrate a valid and enforceable contract to 
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arbitrate.122 Lastly, the court affirmed the trial court’s overruling of the 
Utility Company’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.123  
V.  COMMENT 
Agency capture is the process by which policy is directed away 
from public interest and toward a regulated industry’s interests.124 Here, 
capture would potentially occur if the Commission were to become 
directed more toward the utility industry’s interests than public interest. 
Capture is a structural problem which occurs sometimes, allowing some 
industry interests to systematically win out over others.125 In Sharp, it is 
not apparent the utility industry’s interests systematically won out over 
public interest, and the Commission itself may have even determined it 
could not construe the contract, as the Commission did in Shawnee.  
However, influencing policy is not identical to capturing a 
regulatory agency.126 Of course, capture is often context-dependent, but 
capture may be weak or strong. Strong capture is the idea that interest 
groups’ solicitations are so pervasive and socially costly that no regulation 
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at all might be better.127 Therefore, in some instances, it might be better to 
get rid of entire departments or agencies if public interest is not being 
served.128 Strong capture is not a problem which arises between the 
Commission and the utility industry. Weak capture is when regulation 
discarded in the administrative process is less publically interested than it 
should be but is still on balance for enhancing social welfare.129 However, 
sometimes it might be better to change agency design to tweak 
institutional structure.130 Perhaps it would be better to modify the 
Commission’s authority to interpret net-metering disputes because those 
contracts are highly technical, and the Commission has specialized 
knowledge relevant to utilities that judges do not. 
As mentioned, context matters.131 Agency rulemaking is far more 
insulated from capture than other types of administrative action.132 Here, 
the Commission made the rule that the form the Utility Company used in 
its rebate program had to be “substantially the same” as the Commission’s 
                                                 
127 Engstrom, supra note 6, at 33. 
128 Id. at 34. 
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131 E.g., id. at 33. 
132 Id. 
 241 
form.133 The Commission’s rule is not patently unfair to either party, and 
may actually serve public interest because sometimes arbitrators make a 
pattern of treating one side more favorably. So, if the Utility Company 
were allowed to draft its own form, the Utility Company may have drafted 
a form for mandatory arbitration with an arbitrator of its choosing. If the 
Commission’s rule allowed that hypothetical situation to take place, then 
its rule would not be serving public interest.  
 Administrative systems are designed so capture does not occur. 
“Although public interest groups generally have less influence with an 
agency than industrial groups do . . . today it is rare to find an agency 
serving only a regulated industry’s interests.”134 Professor Engstrom, an 
Associate Professor at Stanford Law School who specializes in topics in 
administrative law,135 thinks capture is not as worrisome as micro-levels 
of agency decision-making.136  
Nevertheless, if capture is a concern, one option is to cut agencies 
out of the process entirely by having legislature write more detailed 
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laws.137 Of course, there are downsides to this because the Commission is 
supposed to have specialized knowledge that the legislature would not 
have.138 Additionally, there is an argument to be made that legislative 
subcommittees are just as susceptible to political influence as 
administrative agencies and would be just as likely to reflect public 
interest.139 Another alternative would be to give courts broad interpretive 
law-making authority.140 
Judicial review can be an important part of the administrative 
system.141 Courts should be wary of players that may or appear to be 
developing a close relationship, especially when one of those players is 
part of the government.142 In Sharp, it is noteworthy the appellate court 
has different reasoning for the decision at bar because the court could have 
decided this case exclusively with contract principals, and it hints at some 
broader policy reasons than the trial court did.143 Courts, including the 
                                                 
137 Id. at 37. 
138 See generally id. at 38. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See generally Engstrom, supra note 6, at 38. 
142 See generally id. 
143 Compare Sharp, 457 S.W.3d 823 (analyzes the Commission’s jurisdiction and the 
Commission’s statutory authority), with Sharp, 2014 WL 5502554 (is concerned with 
presentation of the agreement’s terms). 
 243 
Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri, are usually careful 
to avoid having agencies decide anything outside of those agencies’ 
limited specialized knowledge. Courts have an interest in limiting agencies 
to the powers statutes confer upon them, so courts will try to infer 
legislative intent when determining what powers agencies have. Based on 
judicial interpretation, Missouri legislature only intended the Commission 
have a fairly limited scope of power.144 
Agencies are scrutinized closely because of skepticism related to 
capture, and Professor Engstrom says capture may be a “self-fulfilling 
prophecy.”145 So, here the problem might not be with the Commission 
itself, but with the idea that agencies like the Commission are susceptible 
to outside influence.146 Of course, the judiciary has an interest in 
determining the statute’s meaning, and precedent dictates the Commission 
cannot construe contracts, although it can sometimes act as an 
arbitrator.147  
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Sharp reaffirms the Commission has limited authority, and the 
Commission does not have the power to interpret contracts.148 The 
Commission’s rule the agreement had to be “substantially the same” as the 
Commission’s form seems fair because contract drafters are the “masters” 
of the deal, and it would be unfair to give that benefit to one party. 
However, in this context, the Commission probably has more specialized 
knowledge of utility systems and net metering than most judges do. The 
decision in Sharp means future disputes about net-metering agreements 
could go either way, depending on how that particular judge construes the 
contract.  
Nevertheless, here it is difficult to trace the source of the 
Agreement’s unclarity. Should the Commission have chosen different 
terms for its form agreement, or should the legislature have written a more 
specific statute? Litigation is more expensive than dispute resolution,149 so 
this oversight will impact any parties to future net-metering disputes 
because they too will not be able to arbitrate before the Commission. Of 
course, in net-metering agreement disputes, one party will certainly be a 
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utility company, which means utility companies will have to litigate net-
metering disputes in the future. Here, the legal framework did not leave 
room for any other decision unless the appellate court were to carve out an 
exception for net-metering form agreements, but that decision might 
increase fears of agency capture. However, the appellate court’s broader 
reasoning than the trial court’s reasoning may have been unnecessary.  
Any future disputes over net-metering agreements in the Western 
District, and likely even other parts of Missouri, must therefore encounter 
litigation costs, which could add up to hundreds of thousands or even 
millions of dollars.150 Litigation costs for class actions may be so high as 
to induce settlement by the defendant.151 When defendant corporations 
have high costs, usually the shareholders incur those costs,152 which is 
why some shareholders prefer mandatory arbitration to litigation.153 So, 
the Missouri Court of Appeals of the Western District’s decision in Sharp 
will affect Kansas City Power & Light shareholders and other 
shareholders of Missouri utility companies as well in the future.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
If the Sharp decision is to be predictive of future disputes arising 
out of net-metering agreements between a utility company and its 
consumer, courts will be very careful to limit agency power to what is 
conferred to the agency in the statute. Additionally, courts will be very 
careful in construing the parties’ intent as expressed in the parties’ net-
metering agreement contract. When parties must litigate their disputes, 
they almost certainly incur higher costs compared to alternative dispute 
resolution. Higher costs for utility companies because of litigation arising 
out of net-metering agreements could mean additional costs will be passed 
on to the company’s shareholders. Perhaps utility companies will 
eventually lobby their interests against net-metering agreements, although 
it is difficult to say if the Commission would ever replace net-metering 
agreements with something else. 
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